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1 Introduction
The point of this paper is to bring together three topics: non-existent objects,
mereology, and nothing(ness). There are important inter-connections, which
it is my aim to spell out, in the service of an account of the last of these.1
2 Non-Existent Objects
Let us start with non-existent objects. I will assume a certain view of these.
I will not defend it here; this has been done elsewhere.2 The point in what
follows will be to apply it. So let me simply summarise the core points.
Some objects do not exist: fictional characters, such as Sherlock Holmes;
failed objects of scientific postulation, such as the mooted planet Vulcan;
God (any one that you don’t believe in). Yet we can think of them, fear
them, admire them, just as we can existent objects. Indeed, we may not
know whether an object to which we have an intentional relation of this kind
exists or not. We may even be mistaken about its existential status. The
domain of objects comprises, then, both existent and non-existent objects.
There is a monadic existence predicate, E, whose extension is exactly the
set of existent objects; and the extension of an intentional predicate, such as
‘admire’, is a set of ordered pairs, the first of which exists, and the second
of which may or may not. We might debate how to understand existence.
In the present context, I will assume that to exist is to have the potential to
enter into causal interactions.
1Some of the following material also appears in Priest (2014), esp. 6.13, where much
more is made of nothing(ness).
2See Priest (2005).
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Next, we can quantify over the objects in any domain, whether or not
they exist. Thus, if I admire Sherlock Holmes, I admire something ; and I
might want to buy something, only to discover that it does not exist. I write
the particular and universal quantifiers as S and A, respectively. Normally,
one would write them as ∃ and ∀, but given modern logical pedagogy the
temptation to read ∃ as ‘there exists’ is just too strong. Better to change
the symbol for the particular quantifier (and let the universal quantifier go
along for the ride). Thus, one should read SxPx as ‘some x is such that
Px’ (and AxPx as ‘all x are such that Px’). It is not to be read as ‘there
exists an x such that Px’ — or even as ‘there is an x such that Px’, being
and existence coming to much the same thing. The quantifiers work, note,
in exactly the familiar fashion. In particular, SxPx is true iff something
in the domain of quantification satisfies Px. It is just that the domain may
contain both existent and non-existent objects. If one wants to say that there
exists something that is P , one uses the existence predicate explicitly, thus:
Sx(Ex ∧ Px).
What, however, about the properties of non-existent objects? Consider
the first woman to land on the Moon in the 20th century. Was this a woman;
did she land on the Moon? A natural answer is ‘yes’: an object, charac-
terised in a certain way, has those properties it is characterised as having
(the Characterisation Principle). That way, however, lies triviality, since one
can characterise an object in any way one likes. In particular, we can char-
acterise an object, a, by the condition that x = x ∧ A, where A is arbitrary.
Given the Characterisation Principle, it follows that a = a ∧ A, an so A.
How, then, to proceed? There is a plurality of worlds. Some of these are
possible; some are impossible. The actual world, @, is one of the possible
ones:
Impossible worlds
Possible worlds
@
If we characterise an object in a certain way, it does indeed have the prop-
erties it is characterised as having; not necessarily at the actual world, but
at some world (maybe impossible). Specifically, suppose we characterise an
object as one satisfying a certain condition, Px. We can write this using
an indefinite description operator, ε, so that εxPx is ‘an x such that Px’.
In fact, in what follows, we will be concerned only with cases in which a
unique object satisfies the characterisation. In such cases, we can take the
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characterisation to be of the form ‘an object uniquely satisfying Px’.
Given that we play our paraconsistent cards right, for any condition, Px,
this is going to be satisfied at some world.3 If @ is one such, the description
denotes an object that satisfies the condition there. If not, we select some
other world where it is satisfied, and some object that satisfies it there. The
description denotes that. Hence, we know that if SxPx is true at @, so is
P (εxPx), that is SxPx ` P (εxPx). (Call this the Description Inference.)
But if not, P (εxPx) is true at at least some world. Thus, consider the
description εx(x is the first woman to land on the Moon in the 20th century).
Let us use ‘Selene’ as a shorthand for this. Then we can think about Selene,
realise that Selene is non-existent, etc. Moreover, Selene does indeed have
the properties of being female and of landing on the Moon — but not at the
actual world. (No existent woman was on the Moon in the 20th century;
and no non-existent woman either: to be on the Moon involves causally
interacting with it, and therefore to exist.) Selene has those properties at a
(presumably possible) world where NASA decided to put a woman on one of
its Moon flights.
3 Mereology
So much for non-existent objects. Now let us turn to the subject of mereol-
ogy. Many things have parts. Cars have wheels and engine blocks; people
have hands and feet; countries have states or counties. Mereology is the
investigation of the part/whole relation. In normal parlance, we would not
normally think of the whole as a part of itself. But it does not harm to think
of it as so — as a limiting case. Parts in the usual sense are proper parts.
Standard mereology may be articulated as a theory in first-order logic.
Details can be found in Varzi (2009). Here I just give an informal exposition
of the relevant parts of the theory.4 There is one non-logical predicate, a
binary relation, <. x < y is understood as: x is a proper part of y. A
standard assumption (that I will not challenge here) is that < is transitive
and anti-symmetric:
• (x < y ∧ y < z)→ x < z
• x < y → ¬y < x
Parthood in general, ≤, can be defined in the obvious way. x ≤ y is: x <
y ∨ x = y. A fundamental relation in mereology is that of overlap. Two
3Not necessarily, nota bene, by something that exists at that world.
4The exposition uses some set-theoretic apparatus, but ‘x ∈ Σ’ can simply be replaced
by A(x), where Σ = {x : A(x)}.
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things overlap if they have a part in common. Writing ◦ for overlap, we may
define x ◦ y as : Sz(z ≤ x ∧ z ≤ y). Clearly, every object overlaps itself and
all of its proper parts.
Next topic: mereological summation, or fusion. Some things when fused
together make a single whole. Thus, your car is the fusion of all its parts,
and you are the fusion of all yours. If Σ is a set of objects, I will write their
fusion as ⊕Σ. The Principle of Composition tells us that for appropriate Σ,
the members of Σ have a fusion:
(1) SyAx(x ◦ y ↔ Sz ∈ Σ x ◦ z)
(Something overlaps the fusion of a set just if it overlaps some member.)
If we define ⊕Σ as εyAx(x ◦ y ↔ Sz ∈ Σ x ◦ z), then by the Description
Inference, we have:
(2) Ax(x ◦ ⊕Σ↔ Sz ∈ Σ x ◦ z)
Mereological identity conditions can be given in various ways. A simple way
in the present context is as follows. If two objects are distinct, it is natural
to assume that some object overlaps at least one of them, but not the other.
In other words, two objects are the same if everything that overlaps one,
overlaps the other: Ax((x ◦ y ↔ x ◦ z) → y = z). From this it follows
immediately that the mereological sum of any set with one is unique.
We now come to the main question to be addressed. I said that every
appropriate set has a fusion. But what does ‘appropriate’ mean here? For
a start, there is near-universal consensus that Σ must be non-empty. For
parts to fuse, there must be some of them. Beyond that, there is a debate in
standard mereology between those who think that any non-empty collection
of objects has a sum (unrestricted, or general, composition), and those who
think that not all do (restricted, or special, composition).5 There must be
some kind of coherence between objects for them to fuse. If ∆ = {the
Buddha’s left ear-lobe, the rings of Saturn, the Empire State Building}, then
∆ hardly seems to fuse into a coherent whole.
Who is right? From a noneist perspective, both sides can be right!—in a
way. Like all noun phrases, ‘⊕Σ’ (‘the whole constituted by fusing exactly
the members of Σ’) refers to something—at least if the set Σ is definable (i.e.,
specifiable with a noun phrase). After all, we can think about it, consider
whether or not it exists, and so on. In other words, for any non-empty set,
Σ, Sz z = ⊕Σ. There is no guarantee that it does what one might think it
5Lewis (1991) is a general compositionalist. Van Inwagen (1990) is a special composi-
tionalist. An extreme example of the special compositionalist is the mereological nihilist,
such as Unger (1979), who holds that no sets fuse.
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does, though: that it has exactly the parts in Σ: Ax(x◦⊕Σ↔ Sz ∈ Σ x◦z).
For that we need the truth of (1), and there is no guarantee that this holds.
When Σ is ∆, this seems somewhat implausible.
It is frequently objected to noneism that it has a “bloated ontology”. In
more prosaic (and less inflammatory) terms, it requires us to accept more
objects to exist, or subsist, than are required by necessity. One issue here
is what, exactly, necessity requires, and in particular whether there is a
workable account of intentionality without non-existent objects. However,
the objection is not a very good one anyway. Objects that do not exist,
do not exist; they are not; they are not part of one’s ontology. (Recall the
Greek meaning of the root: ontos = being.) They have, as Meinong put it,
Nichtsein, non-being. I suspect that the objection gets it pull from confusing
Meinong (and noneism), with the pre-‘On Denoting’ views of Russell, who
did give all objects some kind of being: subsistence, if not existence. Be that
as it may, it is frequently objected to general compositionalists that they,
too, have “bloated ontology” of strange objects such as ⊕∆. The reply is the
same. Such objects are purely objects of thought. They have no being, and
so are not part of an ontology.
In sum then, for any non-empty (definable) set, Σ, there is an object ⊕Σ.
This has exactly the parts which are members of Σ, but maybe not at the
actual world. It has them at some worlds—maybe impossible worlds. For
these to include the actual world, (1) has to hold there. This does not answer
the question as to which Σs it does hold for. The natural idea is that it will
hold if the members of Σ are not a disparate collection, that is, Σ does not
have some members which fail to “cohere” with others. How to flesh out this
idea is not at all obvious. However, we do not need to settle the matter here.6
We may leave it at this point, and turn to the third subject on our agenda:
nothing(ness).
4 Nothing(ness)
‘No’ words and phrases are frequently used as quantifier phrases. When Alice
says that she can see no one on the road, she means that for no person, x,
can she see x on the road. But ‘nothing’, can also be a noun phrase. We may
say that Hegel and Heidegger both wrote about nothing. Here, the word is
not a quantifier phrase. This does not mean that for no x did Hegel and
Heidegger write about x. It is a noun-phrase. We can say that they said
different things about it. It is also that out of which the Abrahamic God is
supposed to have created the world. It is nothing (noun phrase) that will
6Some interesting possibilities are discussed in Hudson (2006).
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concern us now. And by nothing, I mean absolutely nothing : the absence
of every thing. To avoid confusion with the quantifier, I will write this in
boldface, thus: nothing. Without boldfacing, the word is the quantifier.
Nothing is an object. We can, for example, think about it. (What things
were like before God created the world.) Heidegger, indeed, claimed that one
can have a direct phenomenological experience of nothing:7
Does such an attachment, in which man is brought before the
nothing itself, occur in human existence?
This can and does occur, although rarely and only for a moment,
in the fundamental mood of anxiety (Angst)...
Anxiety reveals the nothing.
One does not have to share Heidegger’s gothic pessimism, to agree that one
can have a phenomenological experience of nothing. All you have to do is
think about it. This does not, of course, entail that nothing exists. One
can have direct phenomenological acquaintance with non-existent objects.
Indeed, nothing does not exist since, presumably, it is impossible for it to
enter into causal interactions with things.
Of more importance is that nothing is a contradictory object. Since it
is an object, it is something.8 But it is the absence of all things too; so
nothing is nothing. It is no thing, no object. Here, Heidegger got it exactly
right:9
What is the nothing? Our very first approach to the question has
something unusual about it. In our asking we posit the nothing
in advance as something that ‘is’ such and such; we posit it as
a being. But that is exactly what it is distinguished from. In-
terrogating the nothing — asking what, and how it, the nothing,
is — turns what is interrogated into its opposite. The question
deprives itself of its own object.
Nothing, then, is a most strange, contradictory, thing. It both is and is not
an object; it both is and is not something. How to make sense of this?
7Heidegger (1977), p. 102 f.
8Philosophers often wonder why there is something rather than nothing. However,
even if there were nothing—even if everything would be entirely absent—there would be
something, namely nothing.
9Heidegger (1977), p. 98f.
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5 The Empty Fusion
Let us return to mereology. What could nothingness be? An obvious answer
is that it is the fusion of the empty set, ⊕∅. Nothing is what you get when
you fuse no things. There is nothing in the empty set, so nothing is absolute
absence: the absence of all objects, as one would expect. As an object, ⊕∅
is just as as good as ⊕Σ for any other Σ. To ensure that it really does satisfy
its defining condition, we have to take the empty set to be one of those for
which we can apply the schema (1). But this does not seem problematic. The
members of the empty set are not a disparate collection; it has no members
which fail to cohere with others—whatever that means. The members are
all as intimately connected as one might wish!
It is not clear to me why standard mereology is not normally formulated
in this way. It is certainly technically unproblematic. It can be formulated
as in Bunt (1985), the fusion of the empty set making the collection of all
the parts of an object a Boolean algebra.10 And the thought that the fusion
of the empty set is the null object has been made by a few intrepid spirits.11
There is, in fact, an interesting little bit history here. No less a person than
Carnap suggested that one should accept a null object (though hardly in a
way that a noneist might care for):12
It is possible ... to count among the things also the null thing ...
characterised as that thing which is part of every thing. Let us
take ‘a0’ as the name for the null thing ... ‘a0’ seems a natural
and convenient choice as descriptum for those descriptions which
do not satisfy the uniqueness condition.
There is a certain irony here. Some years earlier, Carnap famously castigated
Heidegger for his obscurantism, citing his ruminations on nothing:13
The construction of sentence (1) [‘We seek the Nothing’14] is sim-
ply based on the mistake of employing the word ‘nothing’ as a
noun, because in ordinary language it is customary to use it in
this form in order to construct negative existential statements. ...
10Such a possibility is also noted in Roeper (1997), p. 253; Forrest (2002), p. 81; and
Arntzenius (2012), p. 136.
11For example, Martin (1965) and Bunge (1966)
12Carnap (1947), pp. 36-37.
13Carnap (1932), pp. 70f of the English translation.
14This translation already makes the sentence sound strange. A better translation is
simply: we seek nothing. German capitalises all nouns, and often puts a definite article
before abstract nouns, where English has none. Possibly, Heidegger chooses to use the
article to distinguish the noun from the quantifier (‘nichts’).
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[E]ven if it were admissible to use ‘nothing’ as a name or descrip-
tion of an entity, still the existence of this entity would be denied
by its very definition, whereas sentence (3) [‘The Nothing exists
only ...’] goes on to affirm its existence.
Carnap, in his turn, was criticised by Geach for advocating an object that
‘exists nowhere and nowhen’.15 From a noneist perspective, Geach’s criticism
is, in fact, a term of endorsement. Of course ⊕∅ does not exist—as I have
already noted. Yet is a perfectly good object; and one, indeed, that has the
properties one would expect.
6 Mereology with the Empty Fusion
But how best to formulate mereology with the empty fusion? Let us write n
for ⊕∅. We may now proceed much as before. As in set-theory, each object
has two improper parts: itself and n. x < y still means that x is a proper
part of y. We require that:
• ¬n < x
• ¬x < n
Nothing is not a proper part of anything, and itself has no proper parts.
x ≤ y is defined exactly as before. It follows that n ≤ n. ‘x is a part of
y (in the most general sense)’, x ≤n y, can be defined in the obvious way,
as: x = n ∨ x ≤ y. So for any y, n ≤n y. The empty fusion is a part of
everything, as Carnap averred.
Overlap is also defined exactly as before: x ◦ y is Sz(z ≤ x ∧ z ≤ y).
It follows that n ◦ n (since n ≤ n). Note that it would not be appropriate
to replace ‘≤’ with ‘≤n’, since it would then follow that all thing overlap
with each other. (In the same way, one does not say that two sets overlap
just because the empty set is a subset of each.) Fusion, too, is defined as
before. So for appropriate Σ (including ∅): Ax(x◦⊕Σ↔ Sy(y ∈ Σ∧x◦y)).
Note that the definition of ⊕ does not involve n, so our definition of n is not
circular.
Now for the fireworks. Since ¬Sy y ∈ ∅, it follows from the definition of
n that that Ax¬x ◦ n. Hence, ¬n ◦ n. By definition of ◦, Az(¬z ≤ n), so
¬n ≤ n. By now, it is clear that the theory is inconsistent. The underlying
15Geach (1949), p. 522.
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logic must therefore be a paraconsistent logic. It does not matter much which
one: the amount of logic we are using is pretty minimal.16
Let us continue. Since ¬n ≤ n it follows that ¬n < n ∧ n 6= n. So
n 6= n. But x = n ∨ x 6= n. Reasoning by cases, and using the substitutivey
of identicals: x 6= n. Hence ¬Sx x = n. But of course, Sx x = n. (That is a
logical truth.) To be an object is to be something. So what we have seen is
that nothing both is and is not an object. This is exactly what one should
expect, as we have already seen—and as both Carnap and Heidegger agreed!
Of course, some will take the fact that we have ended up with contradic-
tions as a sign that the formalisation is incorrect. (And there are consistent
formulations of mereology with the empty fusion, e.g., that of Bunt (1985),
which I have already noted.17) Personally, I don’t see it that way. The
approach I have laid out is simple and natural. Its coherence can be demon-
strated by a simple model, which I spell out in a technical appendix to this
paper. And the inconsistency of the theory of nothing is exactly what one
should expect, given its nature.
7 Conclusion
Let me conclude by summarising the main points of the paper. Some objects
do not exist. Yet they can, amongst other things, be the targets of intentional
acts. If one is characterised in a certain way, it will have its characterising
properties at some worlds. One of these is the actual world if, at it, something
satisfies the characterisation. Every collection of objects has a mereological
fusion. This will satisfy its defining characterisation if its members are not
a disparate bunch. The members of the empty set, in particular, have such
a fusion. The fusion of the members of the empty set is nothing. This is
something, but since it is the absence of everything, it is nothing too.
Nothing has always been a notion that philosophers have found puz-
zling.18 For a start, it appears to be contradictory (even when one does not
confuse a quantifier with a noun-phrase). The solution to that bit of the puz-
zle is to accept the appearances at face value. The techniques of noneism,
mereology, and paraconsistency show exactly how.19
16For the sake of definiteness, we may take it to be the relevant logic BX. See Priest
(2002), Sec. 6.7. This contains the Principle of Excluded Middle, which we will need in a
moment.
17In this, contradiction is avoided by defining overlap differently. x◦y isSz(x 6= n∧z ≤n
x ∧ z ≤n y). It then no longer follows that n ◦ n or that ¬n ≤ n.
18For a review of the discussions, see Sorensen (2012).
19Versions of this paper were given in the first half of 2013 at Ohio State University,
Cambridge University, the University of Barcelona, and Melbourne University. Thanks go
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8 Technical Appendix
In this appendix I spell out a simple interpretation of the mereological theory
of nothing. Essentially, it is the four-valued Boolean algebra:
>
↗ ↖
a b
↖ ↗
⊥
where everything is classical, except that the bottom element is both self-
idential and non-self-identical. The construction obviously extends to an
arbitrary Boolean algebra.
To keep things simple, I set this up as a first-order interpretation for the
paraconsistent logic LP .20 The domain of the interpretation is {>, a, b,⊥}.
I will use the elements as their own names; and if I say that an open sentence
is true in the interpretation, this means that it is true for all values of the
variables.
The constant n denotes ⊥. The interpretations of the two predicates are
as follows. (+ indicates membership of the extension; −, membership of the
anti-extension; and ±, both.)
< > a b ⊥
> − − − −
a + − − −
b + − − −
⊥ − − − −
= > a b ⊥
> + − − −
a − + − −
b − − + −
⊥ − − − ±
Clearly, ¬⊥ < x and ¬x < ⊥ are both true, and so is ⊥ = ⊥ ∧ ¬⊥ = ⊥.
Computing the interpretations of ≤ and ◦, we obtain the following:
≤ > a b ⊥
> + − − −
a + + − −
b + − + −
⊥ − − − ±
◦ > a b ⊥
> + + + −
a + + − −
b + − + −
⊥ − − − ±
We can see that ⊥ ≤ ⊥ ∧ ¬⊥ ≤ ⊥ and ⊥ ◦ ⊥ ∧ ¬⊥ ◦ ⊥.
The denotations of the fusion terms are specified as follows.
to members of the audiences for their comments. Thanks also go to an anonymous referee
for the Australasian Journal of Logic.
20See Priest (2002).
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• If Σ 6= ∅ and ⊥ /∈ Σ, ⊕Σ is Lub(Σ) (the least upper bound of Σ). [Case
1]
• If Σ 6= ∅ and ⊥ ∈ Σ:
– if Σ = {⊥}, then ⊕Σ is ⊥ [Case 2a]
– otherwise, ⊕Σ is arbitrary [Case 2b]
• If Σ = ∅, ⊕Σ is ⊥ (of course) [Case 3]
Since there is no conditional in the language, we cannot verify (2) exactly,
but we can show that the two sides of the biconditional have exactly the same
truth values—which would suffice for the truth of the universally quantified
biconditional if one were in the language. There is one exception. There is
no value for ⊕Σ which can do this in the Case 2b. This is not, then, a model
of general composition.
Let us prove these facts. We are concerned with the biconditional: x ◦
⊕Σ↔ Sz ∈ Σ x ◦ z.
Consider an instance of the Case 1, Σ is {>, a}. The biconditional comes
to this: x◦> ↔ (x◦>∨x◦a). If x is ⊥, both sides are just false. Otherwise,
both sides are just true. The other instances of this case are the same.
In the Case 2a, the biconditional reduces to: x ◦ ⊥ ↔ x ◦ ⊥. The result
in this case is trivial.
Now consider an instance of Case 2b, Σ is {⊥, a}. The biconditional
reduces to this: x ◦ s ↔ (x ◦ ⊥ ∨ x ◦ a). Since ⊥ ◦ ⊥, and a ◦ a, ⊥ ◦ s and
a ◦ s. There is no s for which this is true. The other instances of this case
are similar.
Finally, and crucially, Case 3. Take the standard definition of the empty
set: ∅ = {x : x 6= x}. Then the biconditional reduces to: x ◦ ⊥ ↔ Sz(z 6=
z ∧ x ◦ z). If x has any value other than ⊥, the left hand side is just false,
as is the right hand side. For the only z that could make the first conjunct
true is ⊥, and this does not make the second conjunct true. If, on the other
hand, x is ⊥, the left hand side is true and false. The right hand side is true
(take ⊥ for z). But it is also false, that is, its negation is true, since this is
equivalent to Az(z = z ∨ ¬x ◦ z), which is a logical truth.
There is a variation on the model which is worth noting. We change the
entry for 〈⊥,>〉 for < from − to ±, so that ⊥ both is and is not a proper
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part of >, thus:
< > a b ⊥
> − − − −
a + − − −
b + − − −
⊥ − − − ±
This does the same to the corresponding entries in the tables for ≤ and ◦.
Since the connectives are monotonic, everything true/false before remains
so. The arguments that the fusions have the appropriate properties also go
through, except in the instance in Case 1 where Σ = {a, b}. (⊥ overlaps >,
but neither of a and b.) But now, in Case 2b if > ∈ Σ, we can define ⊕Σ
as >, and the argument goes through. For example, if Σ is {⊥, a,>}, the
biconditional is x ◦ > ↔ (x ◦ ⊥ ∨ x ◦ a ∨ x ◦ >). If x is a, b, or >, both
sides are true only. If x is ⊥, both sides are both true and false, as is easily
checked. We can think of ⊕{⊥, a, b,>} as the opposite of nothing—namely
everything.
We see, then, that the mereological theory of nothing is a very well
behaved theory.
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